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 On November 27th, 2010 a massive convoy set off from Islamabad. Tens 
of thousands of Muslims rode cars, buses, bicycles, and even walked the 300 
kilometer journey to the city of Lahore. The purpose of this march was to draw 
attention to the recent rash of terrorism in the country, specifically the violent 
attacks on Sufi shrines throughout Pakistan. In particular, they sought to 
demonstrate to the government that the current lack of action was unacceptable. 
“Our caravans will reach Lahore,” declared one prominent organizer, “and when 
they do the government will see how powerful we are.”1 The Long March to Save 
Pakistan, as it has come to be known, was an initiative of the recently founded 
Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), a growing coalition of Barelvi Muslims. The Barelvi 
movement is the largest Islamic sect within Pakistan, one that has been heavily 
influenced by Sufism throughout its history. It is Barelvis whose shrines and other 
religious institutions have come under assault as of late, both rhetorically and 
violently. As one might expect, they have taken a tough stance against such 
attacks: “These anti-state and anti-social elements brought a bad name to Islam 
and Pakistan,” declared Fazal Karim, the SIC chairman, “we will not remain 
silent and [we will] defend the prestige of our country.”2  
 The Long March is but one example of a new wave of Barelvi political 
activism that has arisen since the early 2000s. Barelvis have begun to actively 
defend their religious identity and heritage in the face of increased aggression 
from Islamic militants. But this is a new phenomenon, unprecedented in the 
Barelvis’ long history dating to the origins of Pakistani Islam. While the Taliban 
and other Islamic militants may dominate the popular Western understanding of 
Islam in Pakistan, it is Sufism that has had the dominant religious influence in the 
region. Frequently described as the inner, mystical branch of Islam, Sufis were 
among the earliest Muslims to arrive in South Asia. Its most easily recognizable 
                                                
1Sunni clerics vow show of strength. (2010, August 8). The Express Tribune,. Retrieved from 
http://tribune.com.pk/.  
2SUI announces long march against terrorism. (2010, August 9). The News. Retrieved from 
www.thenews.com.pk  
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expression can be found in Barelvi practices, with their veneration of Sufi saints 
and ecstatic festivals. However, Sufism has also shaped the development of other 
more traditional, one might say more “orthodox,” Islamic groups in Pakistan, 
although they are reluctant to admit it.3 In contrast to the ecstatic elements of 
Sufism adopted by Barelvis, these traditional groups have drawn on the more 
reserved and intellectual aspects of Sufism. But these two sects, ecstatic and 
intellectual, have been influenced by two very different, some might say opposite, 
elements of Sufism, and have frequently found themselves in conflict. 
 Despite the contrasts, and even contradictions, between them, Sufis of 
both the ecstatic and intellectual persuasions share a common nature in their 
approach to politics. Both groups can be characterized by two tendencies when it 
comes to political engagement. On one hand, they possess an implicit political 
power, a wellspring of political authority that exists predominately on a local, 
perhaps regional, level. On the other, both ecstatic and intellectual Sufis have 
been characterized by a historical disinclination towards wide-scale political 
involvement. Not that there are no Sufis engaged in Pakistani politics, but rather 
that their identity as Sufis has not been an important source of political identity or 
motivation. They have not organized politically on the basis of their religious 
identity, until recently. The 1990s and 2000s have seen unprecedented levels of 
activism on the part of Barelvis. In response to the intensified, and now violent, 
opposition from the Taliban and other militant groups, they have begun to 
mobilize on a national level. This deviation from political inactivity, however, is 
predominately reactionary in nature, and Barelvis have drawn together only in 
response to the threat posed by their opponents. These sparks of political 
engagement must be understood within their historical contexts, heavily 
influenced by the nature of Sufi political engagement in South Asia. Such an 
understanding offers important insight into the complex role played by Sufism in 
Pakistani politics, as well as how the West should approach engagement with 
religion and society in Pakistan. 
 
A Brief History of Sufism in Pakistan 
In attacking the elements of Sufism present throughout Pakistani religious 
life, the Islamic militants are “though they refuse to recognize it…striking at the 
very roots of Islam in South Asia.”4 Sufism is inseparably linked with the history 
of Islam in Pakistan, and all of South Asia – you cannot understand the latter 
without the former. Such history can be rather confusing, however, due to the 
                                                
3\ In Pakistan, the most prominent of these groups are the Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith sects, and 
the Taliban. 
4Lieven, A. (2011). Pakistan: A Hard Country. New York: Public Affairs. pp 134. 
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complexity of the term “Sufism.” When used in the popular discourse, Sufism 
implies a specific group of beliefs and practices, often described as Islamic 
mysticism. Yet, there are a wide variety of practices that fall under the label 
“Sufism,” with more differences than commonalities between them. Generally 
speaking, Sufi practices tend to focus on the personal and mystical elements of 
Islam. According to one scholar, “Sufis strive for a direct, intimate, and 
unmediated experience of the Divine. Sufi adepts tend to emphasize the inward 
over the outward, intuition over intellect, spiritual contemplation over scholarly 
debate, and ecstatic poetry over legalistic prose.”5 While this gives a general 
understanding of the nature of Sufism, it is an oversimplification of the 
multiplicity of beliefs typically defined as Sufi. This is certainly true in Pakistan, 
where a wide variety of Islamic traditions have drawn on various aspects of 
Sufism. These expressions of Sufism tend to have little in common, and it 
becomes difficult to draw sharp lines both between and within such groups. 
However, upon close inspection, it is possible to draw out two main expressions 
of Sufism in Pakistan. 
 
Sufism and Pakistan: Sukr 
The first of these expressions is characterized historically by the word sukr, 
frequently translated as “intoxication.” This strand of Sufism emphasizes the 
ecstatic and joyful union with and self-annihilation in Allah with the intent to be 
“overcome with divine love” emanating from the face of God.6 Prominent scholar 
and Sufi Fethullah Gülen describes sukr as “when a heart boils with extraordinary 
joy and excitement in the moment when the person feels deeply the All-Beloved 
One.”7 Such unions tend to be achieved through poetry and song, but also through 
the use of intoxicants and dance, which has sparked no small amount of 
controversy. In Pakistan, it is the Barelvi school of thought mentioned above that 
has embraced sukr and the ecstatic elements of Sufism. Barelvis trace their name 
to the Indian town of Barielly, birthplace of nineteenth century scholar and 
reformist Ahmed Raza Khan Barielly, who defended the particular practices of 
South Asian Islam. However, though Raza Khan lent his name to the Barelvi 
movement, and offers Barelvis a foundation of scholarly legitimacy, his influence 
                                                
5Rozehnal, R. (2007). Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-First Century 
Pakistan. New York: Palgrave McMillan. pp 1. 
6 Chittick, W. (2000) Sufism: A Short Introduction. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. pp 26. 
7 Gülen, M. (2004) Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism: Emerald Hills of the Heart (Vol. 2). 
New Jersey: Tughra Books. pp 126. 
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on Barelvi beliefs and practices has been relatively minor.8 Rather, at the center of 
Barelvi practices are Sufi saints, who are seen not only as exemplars of faith 
worthy of imitation, but also as active intermediaries between humans and the 
divine.  
The history of these saints, known as shaikhs in Arabic or pirs in Persian, 
dates back to the first arrival of Islam in South Asia. Although the region came 
under Muslim military and political control in the early 8th century, conversion 
was a slow, ongoing endeavor that would last centuries. It was a “lengthy process 
of attrition, of continuing interaction between the carriers of Islam and the 
local…environment.”9  These carriers of Islam were most often Sufi saints, the 
“pioneers and frontiersmen of the Muslim world,” travelling mystics who arrived 
in South Asia shortly after the region was conquered.10 Often hailing from the 
Arab world, the birthplace of Islam, and occasionally claiming to be descendants 
of Muhammad, these saints possessed great credibility in the eyes of many of 
their converts. In fact, many of these early converts to Islam “came to see the 
saints as embodying the only Islam they knew.”11 
One important element of the conversion to Islam is that it occurred in a 
particular manner according to tribal geography. Conversion frequently happened 
on a tribal, not individual basis. The leader of a tribe would travel to the shrine of 
a particular saint, offering to convert not only himself, but his entire tribe, to 
Islam. Moreover, conversion was not necessarily understood at the acceptance of 
a particular doctrine, but rather an acknowledgement of the saint’s religious 
leadership. The act of conversion was frequently seen as a bai’at, or a vow of 
spiritual allegiance to a saint’s authority.12 Over time, a “sacred geography” of the 
country developed, with the veneration of specific saints developed along regional 
and tribal lines.13 Even today, particularly in rural areas, one follows a individual 
saint because he is the saint of their tribe, perhaps responsible for the tribe’s 
conversion or for performing a notable miracle. The importance of conversion for 
the development of Sufism, indeed Islam as a whole, in Pakistan cannot be 
                                                
8 Khan, I. (2011). The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 
Volume 12. Retrieved from http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-assertion-of-barelvi-
extremism 
9 Ansari, S. (1992). Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sinds, 1843-1948. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992. pp 13. 
10 Robinson, F. (2002). Islam and Muslim History in South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. pp 52. 
11 Lieven, 135. 
12 Ewing, K. (1983). The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan. The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 42. 255. 
13 Talbot, I., & Thandi, S. (2004) People on the Move: Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Migration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 183. 
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understated. It left “such a deep impact that intense devotion for sufi saints and 
their lines of descendants became the hallmark of religious practice in the land.”14 
The nature of these initial conversion efforts laid the groundwork for the future 
relationship between the pirs and their followers, as well as establishing the pirs’ 
position within Pakistani society.15 
As the first saints passed away, it came to be believed that possession of 
their barakat was passed down to their descendants. Their spiritual authority was 
“distributed among all the progeny of the saint and harnessed by the few who 
fulfill religious obligations.”16 Some of their barakat settled on the burial places 
of these saints, and so the shrines built there became frequent pilgrimage 
destinations. Sainthood became increasingly independent of personal piety, and 
the saints’ role became institutionalized within South Asian society. While 
veneration of the original saints remained popular, “support for [their] successors 
came to be founded less on belief in an extraordinary power and mission and 
more on belief in spiritual authority sanctified by tradition.”17 These descendants 
became the successors of the original saints, creating a hereditary pir-ship. The 
bai’at, the original ceremony in which the tribal leader acknowledged the saint’s 
spiritual authority, was repeated in front of the saint’s descendants, perpetuating 
the power relationship between pir and follower.18 Frequently, the religious 
authority inherited by the saints’ descendants was used to solidify their own social 
position and wealth, ensuring that they remained central in Pakistani religious life 
up to the present day. 
As noted above, Barelvis are the modern adherents to this system, 
continuing both the veneration of the original saints, and maintaining the role of 
the saints’ descendants.19 While precise statistics are not available, most sources 
agree that Barelvis represent the majority of Pakistani Muslims, with estimates 
ranging from 50%20 to 75%.21  The shrines are still popular pilgrimage 
                                                
14 Ansari, 13. 
15 Ewing, 251-268. 
16 Sherani, S.R. (1991). Ulema and Pir in Pakistani Politics. In H. Donnan & P. Werbner (eds.),  
Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society, London: Macmillan. 
pp 221. 
17 Ansari, 23. 
18 Ewing, 252-3. 
19 Lieven, 136. 
20 Barelvi Islam. (2012, March). Global Security.org. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm  
21 Masood, S. & Gillani, W. (2011, April 3). Blast at Pakistan Shrine Kills Dozens. The New York 
Times.   
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destinations, and festivals known as urs commemorate the death of the original 
saint and celebrate his marriage with God. They draw hundreds of thousands of 
worshippers together for multi-day celebrations, involving music, dancing, 
hashish, and other methods for reaching ecstatic unity.22 Nor do Barelvis limit 
their veneration to millennia-old saints and their descendants. New charismatic 
individuals are constantly arising, some of whom become popular enough to be 
considered modern pirs. A number of shrines have been built for 20th century 
saints by dedicated disciples, seeking to elevate their teachers to new levels (and 
thus improving their own prestige). These individuals, both new and old, still 
serve a tangible purpose in their communities, as explained by one observer of 
Pakistani religious society: 
Many of the new pirs are not frauds. Ordinary people take great comfort 
from them. They give them an outlook on life, and an inspiration. They 
create an emotional counterweight against the constant troubles of life 
here, the calamities that everyone has to face, the sorrow and sheer mess 
of life. They provide a place of spiritual rest for the people. They also 
educate children - which is more than the state does most of the time - 
calm down local fights, reconcile husbands and wives, parents and 
children, or brothers who have fallen out.23 
 
Sufism and Pakistan: Sobriety 
 
The ecstatic traditions of the Barelvis are not the only expressions of Islam 
in Pakistan that have been heavily influenced by Sufism. In contrast to Barelvis’ 
sukr, or intoxication, a second path is characterized by sahw, or sobriety. 
Traditionally, once a Sufi experiences the temporary state of sukr, he or she then 
returns to the “station” of sahw, where one is “conscious, self-possessed, and 
makes deliberate efforts to feel the All-Holy Truth.”24 The experience of unity 
with God leads one to a greater understanding of and appreciation for the 
separation between God and Man, and a realization of the latter’s absolute 
dependence on the former. As William Chittick describes sahw, “it is the human 
response to divine names that designate God’s majesty, glory, splendor, 
magnificence, might, wrath, and vengeance.”25 In classical Sufism, both sukr and 
sahw are seen as important elements of one’s experience with the divine, and the 
two are considered closely related. But if Barelvis have overemphasized the role 
                                                
22 Schmidle, N (2008). Faith & Ecstasy. Smithsonian 39. pp 36-47 
23 Lievan, 143. 
24 Gülen, 127. 
25 Chittick, 26. 
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of sukr while downplaying sahw, this second school has done the opposite. They 
have focused on the importance of sahw, perhaps to the exclusion of sukr. This 
has led to a “reform-oriented intellectually motivated vision of Sufi practice and 
thought, which calls upon followers both to reform their lives according to the 
shari'a and to follow Sufi paths (tariqa) and teachings.”26 
This reform-minded version of Sufism arose in the 16th and 17th centuries 
as a response to the particular direction that Islam had taken in South Asia. A new 
breed of Sufi saints challenged the “certain tendency towards a religious and 
cultural syncretism [that] was then in the air.”27 The Muslim empires of South 
Asia had grown prosperous and powerful, but had also become increasingly 
religious tolerant, even deliberately syncretistic, in order to promote harmony 
among its diverse citizenry. This openness was viewed by a number of religious 
figures as un-Islamic-a betrayal of orthodoxy. Reformist Sufis “adopted various 
tactics from physical assault to ‘ostentatious disdain’ to bring the lives of 
[Muslims] and their court closer to sharia.”28 It is an ironic twist, then, that the 
great tombs which were constructed upon the deaths of these new saints became 
“objects of the popular syncretic devotionalism which they themselves would 
have scorned.”29 During their lifetime, however, these reformist saints laid the 
groundwork for the growth of an intellectually and personally focused version of 
Pakistani Sufism. 
It is difficult to speak definitively of a specific intellectual, reformist 
movement of Sufism that arose in Pakistan, in part because it is not a clearly 
delineated category. But more significantly, the groups themselves shy away from 
the label of “Sufi.” The term Sufi is most often applied to the very practices of 
saint veneration and shrine worship these groups so heavily criticize. 
Unsurprisingly they prefer not to be associated with such practices. But regardless 
of their protestations, Sufism has exerted a powerful influence on these Muslims, 
one “visible in areas of religious experience other than shrine worship.”30 Rather, 
when villagers from one community in northwest Pakistan visit the shrine 
complexes located in the nearby cities, they are “often shocked at what they say 
                                                
26Magnus Marsden. (2005).  Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan's North-West 
Frontier, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33 
27 Hermann Goetz, “The Fall of Vijayanagar and the Nationalization of Muslim Art in the Dakhan.” 
Journal of Indian History 19 (1940), 250. 
28 Robinson, 237. 
29 Eaton, R. M. (1978). Sufis of Bijapur 1300-1700: Social Roles of Sufis in Medieval India. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp 134. 
30 Marsden, 33. 
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are the un-Islamic goings-on inside.”31 For these Muslims, Sufism offers a unique 
source of values, often gleaned from classic Sufi literature and poetry. While the 
beliefs and practices of these Muslims are a sharp contrast with those of the 
Barelvis, the influences of Sufism are undeniably alive and present within them. 
The most visible, and most representative, of the modern groups 
influenced by reformist Sufism is the Tablighi Jama’at (TJ), which roughly 
translates to “The Society for Spreading the Faith.” It was founded in 1927 by 
Muhammad Ilyas who, like many reformers of the time, felt that Muslims had 
strayed too far from the fundamental elements of Islam. But unlike other 
reformers, such as the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia, Ilyas chose to focus entirely on 
the individual elements of his faith. The TJ sought to move Islam out of the 
madrassa and away from the learned scholars into the streets, relying on “lay” 
Muslims to engage in missionary endeavors, calling others to the faithful practice 
of Islam. Ilyas eschewed fancy techniques, technology, and organizational 
methods in favor of the power of personal interaction. His strategy “was to 
persuade Muslims that they themselves, however little book learning they had, 
could go out in groups, approaching even the `ulama, to remind them to fulfill 
their fundamental ritual obligations.”32 Today, the TJ is considered to be one of 
the largest Muslim organizations in the world today, operating in over 150 
countries. Due to its decentralized organization, precise estimates of its numbers 
are difficult to make, but they range between 12 and 80 million.33 
Despite the reformist stance taken by the Tablighi Jama’at and its founders, 
Sufism has had a profound influence on the organization. While they downplay 
such connections, and TJ leaders are extremely reluctant to acknowledge them 
publically, “they have partly preserved and partly developed an internal culture 
that is laden with Sufi-inspired rituals.”34 The structure of the TJ draws strongly 
on that of traditional Sufi orders, publishing hagiographies that cast TJ elders as 
pirs. Some Tablighi leaders go so far as to act simultaneously as a pir, initiating 
followers into a particular Sufi order and collecting money from their Sufi 
disciples in order to finance TJ activities. This behavior reached such levels that a 
                                                
31 Mardsen, 33. 
32 Metcalf, B. (2004). Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. In Islamic 
Contestations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. pp 
272  
33 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. (2010, September 15). Muslim Networks and 
Movements in Western Europe: Tablighi Jama`at. Retrieved 
from http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim-Networks-and-Movements-in-Western-Europe-
Tablighi-Jamaat.aspx.   
34 Reetz, D. (2006). Sûfî spirituality fires reformist zeal: the Tablîghî Jamâʻât in today's India and 
Pakistan. Archives De Sciences Sociales Des Religions, 51. pp 38. 
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decision was made in the 1990s that members should refrain from promoting their 
position as pir using Tablighi resources. That such a statement would be 
necessary is a testament to the popularity of the practice.35 It is not unheard of for 
groups of Tablighis to take on roles as spiritual conduits, similar to the pirs, and 
“the missionary group itself [has become] a channel for divine intervention.”36 
Although they would likely deny it, Sufism has undeniably exerted a strong 
influence in shaping the leadership, organization, rituals, and even philosophy of 
the TJ, to the extent that one scholar has referred to the organization as “a true 
modern incarnation of Sufi aspirations.”37 
 
Sukr and Pakistani Politics  
Returning to the Barelvis and their practices, the development of this 
unique system of saints and shrines in Pakistan has led to two central, and 
somewhat contradictory, trends in terms of political engagement. On one hand, 
the system of shrines has become implicitly, yet deeply, linked to the Pakistani 
political landscape. The pirs possess a significant amount of power in their role as 
religious mediators, the men who control access to the divine. Not only are pirs 
placed at the center of Pakistani religious life, but the ability to either limit or 
increase access to God serves as a powerful incentive for their followers. The 
centrality of the pir in regional Pakistani society has even manifested a capability 
to undermine and threaten the authority of larger political entities. The shrines and 
their saints draw loyalties to themselves, drawing citizens away from identifying 
with the Pakistani nation-state. This challenge to the state’s authority is intensified 
when shrines offer social services, such as food or education, which further 
supplants the state’s functions. In other countries, most notably Turkey, the 
authorities reacted to this challenge by attempting to suppress such institutions. 
Muslim authorities in Pakistan, however, have recognized the potential of such 
influence and sought to tap it into it in order to solidify their own legitimacy. 
They granted large tracts of land to the pirs and expanded their shrines, which 
further reinforced the pirs’ power.38 The British, like the Muslim rulers before 
them, also recognized the pirs political role, and sought to gain their allegiance, or 
at least avoid revolt, through grants and land protections, with similar effects.39  
                                                
35 Reetz, 37-39. 
36 Metcalf (2004), 274. 
37 Reetz, 48. 
38 Eaton,  
39 Gilmartin, D. (1978). Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab. Modern 
Asian Studies, 13. pp 494-96. 
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Thus the pirs and their shrines acquired a powerful political influence that 
has played an important role in Pakistani politics up through the twentieth century. 
One should note, however, that such influence has been remarkably implicit and 
passive. While it is a source of political power frequently tapped by others, it has 
never been actively exerted by the pirs themselves. The Muslim League drew on 
“tacit religious support [from] the rural areas,” i.e. the pirs and their shrines, to 
secure victory in the 1937 elections.40 Ayub Khan (President from 1958 to 1969), 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (President 1971 to 1973, Prime Minister from 1973 to ’79), 
and General Zia ul-Haq all sought to tap into the pirs influence for their own 
purposes, which will be discussed later, but also recognized the challenge posed 
by the pirs to Pakistan as a modern nation-state. According to Javid Iqbal, the 
architect of the government’s policies towards the shrines, popular Sufism 
"enervated the people and kept them steeped in all kinds of superstition.”41 The 
government distributed pamphlets that emphasized the saints as humans, 
highlighting their social goals and reformist activities as well as the government’s 
similar efforts. The government even tried to recast Sufi cosmology, emphasizing 
the immanence and accessibility of God, and removing the pirs from their role as 
intercessor.42 But throughout the 20th century, the shrine system served as a source 
of political authority upon which others drew on, not one prone to action itself. 
Recognizing the danger, mentioned above, to Pakistan as a modern nation 
state, a concentrated effort has been made by several administrations to 
undermine the political power of the pirs and their shrines. The Auqaf 
Department, founded in 1959, gave the government the power to “take direct 
control over and to manage shrines, mosques, and other properties dedicated to 
religious purposes.”43 The government began to construct large, modern, and 
highly visible additions to the shrines, recasting them as centers for social services. 
New schools and health clinics provided modern alternatives to the traditional 
education and medicine offered by the shrines’ caretakers. Under Zulfikar Bhutto, 
government officials were encouraged to take on a participatory role in the 
performance of religious rituals, such as washing the saint’s tomb, that were 
traditionally handled by the pirs’ descendants.44  The government not only 
recognized the shrines as a center of latent political power, but considered the 
regional locus of loyalties a threat to the development of a cohesive nation state. 
                                                
40 Gilmartin, 508-12. 
41 Iqbal, Javid.(1971). Ideology of Pakistan, 2nd ed. Karachi: Ferozsons. pp 58. 
42 Ewing, 259-65 
43 Ewing, 258. 
44 Buehler, A.F. (1997). Currents of Sufism in Nineteenth- andTtwentieth-Century Indo-Pakistan: 
An Overview. Muslim World,  87. pp 310-11. 
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Despite the government’s best efforts, and the view that "unless and until 
the Mullah and the Pir are excluded from our religious life there is no likelihood 
of the successful dissemination of enlightenment, liberalism and a meaningful and 
vital Faith among the people of Pakistan,” the political influence of the pirs could 
not be suppressed. Even as he tried to undermine the pirs, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
presented himself as a “divinely inspired guide and teacher,” and the mausoleum 
where he and his daughter Benazir are buried is highly reminiscent of a saint’s 
shrine.45 A great number of contemporary Pakistani politicians, including the 
Prime Minster, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani; Deputy Prime Minister Makhdoom 
Amin Fahim; Foreign Minister, Syed Mahmood Qureshi; and Minister for 
Religion Syd Ahmed Qazmi are all from pir lineages, as are numerous prominent 
figures in the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Muttahida Quami Movement 
(MQM), and various wings of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). One such 
figure, Altaf Hussain of the MQM, is even referred to by his followers as “Pir 
Sahib.”46 Some politicians have gone as far as to mimic the rituals and festivals 
centered on the shrines. Anatol Lieven, British author and journalist, observed 
that “At PPP rallies, I have seen many party supporters shaking their heads 
violently from side to side in the manner of ecstatic devotees at saintly 
festivals.”47 
The second characteristic of Barelvis in regards to political engagement 
has been a trend of political quietism on the national level. Regardless of the 
strong ties between the pirs, their shrines, and political authority, Barelvis have 
historically avoided wide-scale, active political engagement. While the pirs 
possess a very tangible political power, they have rarely chosen to exert that 
power explicitly on a widespread level. Most notably, despite the prevalence of 
political parties in Pakistan grounded in an Islamic identity, Barelvis have not 
developed the powerful organizations such as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) or the 
Jamiae-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), both affiliated with the Deobandi school, which is 
the largest traditional Islamic sect in Pakistan.48 Even their opponents have 
                                                
45 Lieven, 136. 
46 Lieven, 136-7. 
47 Lieven, 135-7 
48 The Debandi are a reformist movement that arose in the mid-19th century in South Asia, and is 
the most popular Islamist group in Pakistan today, as well as the second largest Islamic sect in 
Pakistan today, after the Barelvis. Deobandis are the most visible example of the traditional, or 
orthodox Islamic sects, preaching that the original ideals of Islam have been corrupted in the 
modern world, and calling for a return to a more “pure” Islam. They are the most politically active 
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acknowledged the lack of political cohesion among Pakistani Sufis. Although 
Syed Abdul Ala Maududi, notable Islamist reformer and founder of the JI, 
recognized the pervasiveness of the tradition, “he did not consider [Sufism and 
Barelvism] a potent force, given its lack of a political system."49  
While the explanation behind this lack of political participation is complex, 
it is rooted in the very nature of the Barelvi tradition. Centering religious activity 
on the shrines has led to a religious geography that is very regional in nature, as 
discussed above. The result has been a highly decentralized religious movement, 
one that lacks a sense of unity across regions. Practically speaking, there is no 
uniting religious or political ideology out of which a national movement could be 
brought. One’s religious loyalties and interests often end at a particular pir and his 
shrine, which presents major challenges for any type of wide-spread organization. 
No one pir possesses much authority over the followers of another pir or his 
followers, thus preventing the development of effective leadership. Further, the 
lack of a compelling mutual interest has presented a fatal flaw for efforts to draw 
the pirs together. “Every attempt at creating [Barelvi] parties over the decades,” 
writes Lieven, “has foundered on the deep rivalries and jealousies between (and 
indeed within) the great pir families.”50 There simply has not existed the sufficient 
ideological common ground to overcome the regional locus of Barelvi practices. 
One’s identity as a Barelvi provides connections on the tribal and regional levels, 
but little beyond that, which has tended to inhibit political activism beyond such 
levels.  
 
Sahw and Pakistani Politics 
Although the elements of Sufism adopted by the Tablighi Jama’at look 
radically different from those of the Barelvis, the movement has developed 
similar characteristics regarding political engagement. Thus, the TJ also exhibits a 
tacit involvement with political structures contrasted with an explicit avoidance of 
active politicking. “Political power,” Ilyas stated, “can never be” the objective of 
a true Muslim.51 In fact, the movement’s founder believed that political power 
could only be achieved when all Muslims had successfully brought their personal 
lives into accordance with Islam. Considering the propensity of human weakness, 
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50 Lieven, 142. 
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it is doubtful that such an event would ever occur. The TJ has shunned party 
politics, in Pakistan, India, and all countries in which the TJ operates, refusing to 
take sides in the political arena. As a result of this approach, the TJ is remarkably 
suited for operating in a secular environment, although the movement denies a 
secular orientation. Unsurprisingly, this has become a major critique of the TJ for 
Muslims who believe that secularism and Islam are completely incompatible. One 
Islamic activist commented that the TJ has influenced Muslims to be “docile, fate-
oriented and has [made them] shun active involvement in real life things like 
politics and society.”52 
However, recent scholarship has begun to question this view of the 
Tablighi Jama’at as a completely apolitical entity. Some believe that the TJ’s 
intentional effort to remain politically aloof is itself a political statement. 
Although not explicitly active, the TJ is “deeply engaged in questions of power, 
legitimacy and authority which are the very stuff of politics.”53 In particular, the 
emphasis on the flawed nature of man and creation offers a powerful critique of 
organized political systems of all varieties. But, though refusing to become 
explicitly political, the TJ has also offered itself as a source of political energy 
available for others to tap. Particularly in Pakistan, the TJ has been used by 
militant Islamists as a springboard, utilizing the organization as a pre-existing 
structure through which to operate. A number of Islamic militants have been 
previously involved in TJ circles, including Richard Reid, who in 2001 attempted 
to destroy an American Airlines flight with explosives in his shoes.54  
As with Barelvism and the shrine system, there are a number of Pakistani 
political figures who have strong ties with the TJ. Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, 
President of Pakistan from 1998 to 2001, was a senior TJ member. Both Maulana 
Muhammad Zakariya, who served as Chief Minister of the North-West Frontier 
Province, and Lt. General Javed Nasir, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 
from 1992 to ’93, have been connected to TJ groups. While there is little evidence 
that the TJ is deliberately pushing for members to take political office, or 
supporting Islamic militants, it is clear that the organization has been drawn into 
the political sphere. Despite the contrasts between the Tablighi Jama’at and 
Barelvism in their beliefs and practices, the two are remarkably similar in how 
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they have become passively intertwined with Pakistani politics, despite avoiding 
widespread, explicit political action. 
 
Political Awakening 
In summary, Sufism has played a complicated role in the history of 
Pakistani politics. On one hand, Sufis of both the sukr and sahw persuasion have 
generally avoided political activism. Despite the overwhelming presence of 
Sufism in the Pakistani religious landscape, no effective Sufi political party has 
arisen. In fact, Sufism’s influence has directed Muslims, both Barelvis and 
Tablighis, away from organized political involvement. On the other, it is nearly 
impossible to ignore how Sufism has become subtly involved in the Pakistani 
political environment. These effects have been implicit, until recently. Since the 
early nineties, Pakistani Sufis have begun to mobilize in a much more organized 
fashion. Barelvis, in particular, have begun to “shake off [their] traditional posture 
of political acquiescence” in response to increased hostility from more 
conservative Islamic sects, including militant organizations.55 In the last ten years 
especially, Barelvis have come together on an unprecedented scale for the explicit 
purpose of protecting their religious traditions. However, this activism is 
reactionary in nature, and Barelvi activists have faced major challenges arising 
from those elements of Sufism that have inhibited political organization in the 
past.  
The vast majority of this hostility has been focused on Barelvis, and other 
practitioners of shrine worship. The central role of saints and their shrines has 
been seen as much farther outside the realm of Islamic orthodoxy than the 
intellectual, reformist variety of Sufism. The legacy of competition between 
Deobandi and Barelvi mosques dates back over a century. Since the early 20th 
century, the two movements engaged in an ongoing “Fatwa War,” as each school 
of thought seeks to delegitimize the other by often issuing opposite positions on 
legal issues.56 But while critiques of this type of Sufism have existed almost since 
its founding, the policies of military dictator General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, 
who ruled Pakistan from 1977 to 1988, empowered the critics. General Zia ul-Haq 
was personally sympathetic to the efforts of Islamists, and effectively placed 
government support behind conservative Islamic groups, most notably the 
Deobandis.57 He initiated a state Islamization program that, while its short-term 
effectiveness is questionable, laid the foundations for the long-term strengthening 
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of Islamist groups, particularly militants, in Pakistan. An ardent anti-Communist, 
Zia ul-Haq provided funds, weapons, and training to the Mujahidin for their jihad 
in Afghanistan, much of which found its way into the hands of Islamist parties in 
Pakistan. Under the auspices of the Cold War, the United States also supplied 
money and arms to militant groups for use in Afghanistan, which were saved by 
those groups after the war, or simply never arrived in Afghanistan in the first 
place.58  
This explicit state support combined with a number of other factors to 
promote rapid growth of Islamist groups in Pakistan. Another large source of 
support has been Saudi Arabian efforts at proselytization sparked by the explosion 
of the oil industry in the mid-twentieth century. Millions of dollars were poured 
into Pakistan, as military aid against the Soviets, but also as an effort to spread the 
Saudi’s highly conservative Wahhabi brand of Islam.59 Such money lasted well 
beyond the conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet conflict, and continues extensively 
today. A U.S. government official estimated that as of 2008, over $100 million 
annually was making its way to Islamist clerics in Pakistan from sources in Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.60 One effect of this infusion of funding has 
been an explosion in the number of Deobandi madrassas, particularly as compared 
to their Barelvi equivalents. In 2002, there were over 7,000 Deobandi madrassas 
in Pakistan, up from 1,778 in 1988, a growth of 294 percent. In comparison, 
Barelvi madrassas only saw a 121% increase, going from 717 to 1,585 in the same 
period.61 This increase in Deobandi mosques was not limited to new constructions, 
either. Barelvis have consistently complained that mosques “are being seized 
through armed conflict at an unprecedented rate,” as well as through legal 
manipulation and intimidation.62 Overall, the increase in support for the 
Deobandis and other Islamist groups, from a number of sources, that occurred in 
the 1980s served to intensify their historical animosity towards Barelvis. It would 
lead to two decades of escalated hostility between the two groups. 
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In response to this increased animosity from Deobandis and other 
Islamists, Barelvis in the early 1990s began to respond, despite their previously 
apolitical character. One of the most significant of such organizations is Sunni 
Tehreek (ST). ST was founded in the early 1990s by Saleem Qadri and Barelvi 
youth who, in response to Deobandi aggression, “could no longer tolerate the 
occupation of Sunni mosques by Deobandis.”63 It was not a political party, per say, 
but the ST represents the first truly popular expression of Barelvi political 
activism. The mission of the organization was laid out in four goals: 
1. The protection of Ahle Sunnat (Barelvi) beliefs. 
2. The protection of the rights of the Ahle Sunnat. 
3. The protection of Ahle Sunnat mosques. 
4. The protection of the Ahle Sunnat awqaf (religious endowments), such as 
shrines.64  
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Figure 1. Growth in Pakistani Madrassas, 1988-2002 (Data adapted from Khan 2011.) 
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As the word “protection” implies, the ST was reactionary in nature, 
formed in response to a perceived threat to Barelvis and their practices. A 
particular focus was on not only defending, but reclaiming mosques that had been 
lost to Deobandis. They accused the government of favoring Deobandi groups, 
and demanded that a greater number of Barelvi imams be appointed to army-
operated mosques. 65 Later, as the Taliban and other militants began to operate 
more frequently within Pakistan, they would expand their focus to include these 
threats as well.66 In comparison, you do not see this same political activation by 
the Tablighi Jama’at, despite similarities in its approach to politics. The TJ’s 
practices simply did not garner the same amount of criticism, and thus did not 
have the same impetus for political organization as the Barelvis. They were not 
faced with the same threat as the Barelvis, and thus were not pushed to react. 
It is important to note that, however, that from its very beginnings Sunni 
Tehreek has embraced force and even violence in order to secure its goals. Saleem 
Qadri was originally a follower of Pir Mohammad Ilyas Attar Qadri, who 
advocated for a non-violent response to Deobandi aggression. The two split over 
the latter’s pacifism, with Saleem stating that “non-violence was not taking the 
Barelvis anywhere.”67 Throughout the 1990s, ST began to assert itself 
aggressively, using force when necessary to retake mosques that had allegedly 
been taken from them by Deobandi groups. Over the two decades since the 
movement’s birth, it has become increasingly militant. Many consider the 
organization to be responsible for the 2000 assassination of Yusuf Ludhianvi, a 
prominent Deobandi figure. Throughout the 2000s, the violence between ST and 
more conservative groups has escalated, with one attempt to seize control of a 
Deobandi mosque in 2007 turning into a shootout that left one bystander dead and 
several others injured.68 While ST disputes its characterization as a militant group, 
insisting its purposes are “defensive” only, their willingness to resort to force has 
driven many Pakistanis to classify them as another violent sectarian 
organization.69 
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Although the intentional, if reactionary, activism of the Sunni Tehreek is a 
notable step into the political arena, Barelvi political activism has dramatically 
expanded in the early- to mid-2000s. The American invasion of Afghanistan 
further energized the Taliban and other militant activity in the region and 
conservative Islamist groups became increasingly violent towards Barelvis. In an 
early attack, Saleem Qadri was assassinated by a member of a Deobandi terrorist 
organization in 2001. Activity particularly intensified in the mid-2000s, with one 
independent study counting 35 separate attacks on Barelvi shrines since 2005, 
with hundreds of casualties.70 In 2009, a suicide bomber from the Tehreek-e-
Taliban, a Deobandi movement, killed Mufti Sarfraz Naeemi, a prominent Barelvi 
scholar and fierce opponent of the Taliban who had declared: "The military must 
eliminate the Taliban once and for all."71 Perhaps most damaging was the Nishtar 
Park Tragedy in 2006, where a suicide bomber wiped out the entire senior 
leadership of the Sunni Tehreek along with dozens of Barelvis.72 If the conflict 
between Barelvis and conservatives had been simmering since the late 1980s, it 
was in the 2000s that it expanded into a full blown conflict. 
In response to this violent intensification, Barelvis have further increased 
their political activity.  The strongest and most notable instance has been the 
formation of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC), an alliance between eight smaller 
Barelvi groups. In 2009 they launched a “Save Pakistan” movement to “stem the 
menace of Talibanisation.”73 The organization has since ballooned to include over 
60 groups and embarked on an aggressive public relations campaign. Goals 
include calling for the government to ban “incendiary Deobandi literature,” crack 
down on supposedly banned extremist groups, and increase police action against 
terrorism suspects.74 The previously mentioned Long March to Save Pakistan was 
one of the largest, but certainly not the only, example of the SIC’s awareness 
                                                
70 Attacks on Pakistani Shrines. Terrorism Watch Pakistan. Retrieved from 
http://terrorismwatch.com.pk/Attacks%20on%20Shrines%20In%20Pakistan.html. 
71 Haider, Z. (2009, May 13).  Pakistan moderate clerics speak out against Taliban. Reuters, 
Retrieved from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/us-pakistan-clerics-
idUKTRE54C1JQ20090513; Tenveer, R. (2009, June 13). Suicide bomber assassinates Mufti 
Naeemi: Taliban turn against religious scholars. Daily Times.. Retrieved from 
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009/06/13/story_13-6-2009_pg1_1 
72 Bomb carnage at Karachi prayers. (2006, April 11). BBC News. Retrieved from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4900402.stm 
73 Correspondent. (2009, May 9). Eight parties form alliance against Talibanisation. The News, 
Retrieved 
from  http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=22032&Cat=13&dt=5/10/2009. 
74 Abouzid, R. (2010, December 21). The Hidden War. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_hidden_war?page=0,7 
19 
 
campaign.75 Activists have gone as far as to express gratitude towards those 
militants for waking Barelvis from their political slumber. "We're thankful to 
them, those who started destroying things like the shrines, because they forced us 
to wake up, come together and confront them, God willing," declared Sayyed 
Safdar Shah Gilani, a Sufi cleric and a key figure in the SIC. "We [have been] 
compelled to come out on the streets."76  
However, the Sunni Ittehad Council, like Sunni Tehreek, is a reactionary 
creature, and faces a number of challenges ahead. Contemporary attempts at 
Barelvi political organization must overcome the same factors that have hindered 
such activity in the past. The recently intensified hostility on the part of Islamist 
organizations has provided enough of a common cause to draw Barelvis together 
into a semblance of unity for now, but this newly found consensus is fragile. 
Critics have already pointed out that the movement’s focus is predominately anti-
shrine attack, rather than anti-terrorism or even pro-Barelvi. Above all, it is a 
coalition built on self-preservation, which poses serious challenges for the 
organization’s leadership. Already factional divisions have arisen, both between 
the SIC and other Barelvi groups who have refused to join and between groups 
within the SIC itself. In 2011, one SIC leader sharply criticized several other 
senior members for receiving money from the United States. A number of groups 
neglected to participate in the 2010 protest march, despite previous promises to do 
so. Accusations have also been made that certain leaders are using the SIC as a 
platform to increase their own power and prestige. It is clear that the regional and 
structural aspects of Sufism that have inhibited political activity for centuries still 
exert a powerful influence on Pakistan today.77 
 
Conclusion 
When the original saints first arrived in South Asia, it is doubtful that they 
imagined the extent to which Sufism would influence the Pakistani religious 
landscape. From the ecstatic shrine worship of the Barelvis to the missionary 
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activities of the Tablighi Jama’at, a number of elements of Sufism can be found 
throughout Pakistan, and indeed much of South Asia. It is curious, then, that 
Sufism would not play a greater role as a political identity, considering its 
widespread popularity. Rather, as we have seen, the influence of Sufism has 
tended to suppress large-scale political organization. For both ecstatic and 
reserved Sufis, their religious identity has not been an important component of 
their political identity and, despite a number of Islamic political parties, no Sufi 
parties have materialized. Such was the nature of Sufi political engagement for 
centuries. 
Yet, clearly this disinclination towards national politics has begun to 
change. Organizations like Sunni Tehreek and the Sunni Ittehad Council stand at 
the forefront of an unprecedented wave of Barelvi activism, drawing Barelvis 
throughout Pakistan together in the face of increasing hostility and even violence. 
While certainly a challenge to the militant Islamists who have caused so much 
strife lately, on a closer inspection these movements may not be as united as they 
appear. Both Sunni Tehreek and the SIC have mobilized in direct response to a 
perceived threat to the foundation of their religious practices.  But their action is 
perhaps better described as re-action, and their unity is one imposed by necessity. 
Reformist Sufis, such as the Tablighi Jama’at, who have not faced the same 
hostility, have continued their political disengagement. Sunni Tehreek, the SIC, 
and similar organizations face many challenges on the road ahead, challenges 
rooted in the very nature of Pakistani Sufism. Despite new and novel political 
expressions, Sufis are still influenced by those factors which prevented political 
organization for so long. 
The arrival of these Barelvi political organizations, then, is more complex 
than may first appear, and it is necessary to understand them within their 
historical and social context. The nature of Pakistani religious life is highly 
regional, with many loyalties extending no further than a particular saint or tribe. 
While Barelvi political activity has been noticeably absent from the national stage, 
Sufi shrines and descendants of saints are frequently found at the center of local 
political hierarchies. Over time, those who control the shrines have managed to 
accumulate a considerable amount of spiritual and political authority. And while 
this authority does not typically extend beyond a limited geography, and in fact it 
tends to inhibit widespread political activity, it is an integral element of both the 
Barelvi tradition and Pakistani politics. 
Looking forward, this more complex and realistic understanding of 
Pakistani Sufism challenges our current conception of Pakistan as a nation-state. 
Noting the artificial nature of Pakistan is not a new observation, but it further 
underlines the need for a more flexible understanding of the country as a 
disjointed socio-political entity. The current nation-state framework has been 
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placed on top of a highly diverse and locally focused region and frankly, the 
wisdom of even speaking of Pakistan as a unified entity is questionable. Our 
knowledge of Barelvi history and traditions is quite limited, leading to an 
oversimplistic understanding of Pakistan’s internal religious dynamics. The 
available literature on popular religion in Pakistan is sparse indeed. Yet, as this 
paper has hopefully shown, modern Pakistani Sufism is worthy of far more 
attention than it has received. As Pakistan’s role in the global community 
continues to grow, it is more important than ever before, that we grow in our 
understanding of the nation’s unique and complex religious traditions. 
 
In particular, this complex understanding of religion in Pakistan, and its 
political engagements, challenges the frameworks with which the West has 
approached religion and politics in Pakistan. One such understanding of Sufism, 
frequently propagated by American think tanks, sees it as an asset the West 
should “harness” in the ideological struggle against Islamic radicalism, that Sufis 
are “"natural allies of the West."78 But this approach vastly oversimplifies and 
misunderstands the role of Sufism in Pakistan. The interests of the two simply do 
not line up quite that nicely, and Barelvi clerics are among the most outspoken 
Pakistani critics of U.S. foreign policy. A number of Barelvi scholars (including 
several central SIC organizers) rallied in support of Mumtaz Qadri, who 
assassinated the governor of Punjab in 2011 because of the governor’s opposition 
to certain anti-blasphemy laws.79 Some critics are concerned that, rather than 
marginalizing the voice of Islamists, promoting Barelvi organizations would 
simply lead to “a faith war between Sufi and Salafi in Pakistan.”80 This 
conception of Sufism as a panacea to Islamic extremism faces a number of 
difficulties, and fails to fully comprehend the complexities of Sufism in Pakistan. 
While some progress has been made, we must continue to push beyond a simple, 
dualistic framework and seek a more complex and nuanced understanding of 
Sufism, indeed the whole of Islam, in Pakistan today. 
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